As Evert W. Beth argues: "According to the current view, mat hematics is concerned wi th imma terial objects: poin ts witho ut di mensions, lines w ith no thickness and so on."' In other words, this common view argues that mathematics is concerned with abst ractions.
"Mathematics abstracts, id ealizes, sche matizes, constru cts, simulates.'? According to Putnam, mathematical truth comes from the fact that mathematics is an objective science, and as he states:
Math ematics should be interpreted realisti cally -that is, that mathematics makes asser tions that are objectiv ely tru e or false, ind ep endently of the human m ind, an d th at something answers to such mathematical notions as 'set' and ' function'. This is not to say that reality is somehow bifurcated -that is, th er e is one reali ty of mate ria l things, and then , over and above it, a seco n d reality of ' ma th em a ti ca l things'.'
If we accept Putnam's view on mathemati cal truth, how can we, human beings, witnes s and fully conceive the found a tions of mathematics? We, human beings, have access only to the material world. If mathematics has a second reality of 'mathematical thin gs'
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which we cannot observ e and en vision, can we still believe that ma thematics has its fou ndations in our real wo rld?
Putnam argues tha t mathematics d oes not have a crisis in its foundations . He does not believe tha t mathematics either has or need s foundations. In our traditiona l thinking, we ascribe prope rties such as length , width, thickness to material objects, and therefore, whe n a human being thinks of a material object, she / he directly links it with the subjective object, not a real external object. If such objects .which we call external objects, exist, we cannot visualize the m, but can conceive their pow ers . For example, we cannot visualize a 'set' as we can visualize an 'apple', but w e can use the notion of a 'set' in constructing powerful mathematical theories, and conceive the power of thi s construction, although it is not a subjective object.
The first step to obtaining ma thematical tru th is by obtaining mathematical kno wledge. Becau se mathema tical objects are non-ph ysical realities, the common view, as Putnam points out, is that the kind of knowled ge we have in mathematics is str ictly a pri ori. H owever, Putnam also ar gues tha t mathematical knowled ge ,in fact, resembles empirical knowledge -" that is. that the criterion of truth in mathema tics just as mu ch as in physics is success of our id eas in pra ctice, and that mathem atical knowledge is corrigible and not absolute.:" Therefore, what matters in mathema tical truth is the power of its non-physical realities in making a coherent link that is understandable by the physical wo rld . In thi s sense, mathematica l knowled ge plays an important role in mediating between the physical world and the non-physical realities of ma thematical tru th. In other word s, mathematical knowledge ma kes mathematical tru th und ersta ndable by the physical wo rld .
Mathema tical knowledge starts with precise definitions and auxiliary assump tions . Then, these defin itions are linked together under the assumptions, an d theories are formed . Thomas Hobbes's definitions of science.in his book Leviathan, is that science is the know led ge of consequ ences. In the light of his definition, mathematical objects are the kno wled ge of the consequences of each link be tween given definitions, conclusions and auxiliary assumptions.
What ar e the criteria for a good foundation of a mathematical theory? 1) ASSUMPTIONSMUSTBEREAUSTIC Assumptions are made to simpl ify situation s, but they must have a large scope . They should be bro ad enough to be applied to mor e complicated situations.
2) DEFINITIONSMUST BESIMPLE, CLEARAND PRECISE.
3) ASSUMPTIONSANDDEFINITIONSMUSTBECONSISTENT: The theoretician m ust use them consistently in each link of the axiomatic structure, and newly built defini tions must not con tradict the older ones . 4) DEFINITIONSAND EACHSTEP OFTHEAXIOMATICARGUMENT JvfUSTBEFRUITFUL; They must enable the construction of new definitions and new steps from them.
If these Kuhnian inspired conditions are satisfied, the mathematical objects which are the basic ingre dients of mathematical kno wle dge w ill be based on a strong foundation. Theorems, propositions and so on which will arise from this foundation will be coherent since their bu ild up will consist of consistent link s between the knowledge of consequences of each step we take.
As Putnam argues, generally, in empirical sciences, for each theory, there exists other alternative theories, or those which are stru ggling to be born. He notes:
As long as the major parts of classical logic and number theory and analysis have no alternatives in the field-alternatives which require a change in the axioms and which effect the simplicity of total science, including empi rical science, so that a choice has to be made-the situation w ill be what it has always been. 5 This argument suggests tha t once a theory whic h is more powerful tha n the alrea dy existing one appears, it is justified to accep t the new theory. Putnam believes 44 that the mathematicians can be wrong, not in the sense that their proofs are m islead ing, bu t that the au xiliary assumptions they use might be wrong . He believes that this flexible character of ma thematics which allows alternatives into the field makes mathema tics 'empirical' .
His un derstanding of mathematics resembles the Kuhnian notion of parad igms. As Kuhn su gges ts, many different pa rad igms can exist in science. He argues that if an already existing paradigm has anomalies, and contradictions, a new pa radigm is formed . According to Kuhn , as long as both of the paradigms are able to generate and solve puzzles, they are equally adequate. It does not ha ve to be that the supporters of the different paradigms are in disagreement. Kuhn's paradigms are incommensur able. Similarly, Pu tnam allows the existence of d ifferent paradigms in mathematics. An example to th is notion in mathema tics is the non-riva l existence of bot h Euclid ean and nonEuclidean geometry.
What happens if a newly formed theory is in con tradiction with the already existing one? According to Popper, we wo uld the n have to test the two theories and falsify the less-satisfactory one. However, this contradicts the notion of mathema tical truth that once a mathematica l problem is solved, it is solved foreve r." If a mathematical theory is formed on the bas is of the criteria I have suggested, it is im possible that a proof would be wrong since each knowled ge we acquire at each step of our theory is a conseque nce of the conclusions we acquire in the preceding step. Therefore, if it happens that a theory contradicts the other, we might want to follow Duhem's suggestion and look at the auxiliary assumptions we make. It might be that our assumptions are false, or that the assumptions of the two contradicting theories are inco mmensurable.
Having discussed the foundations of mathematical knowledge, next we ask the question : "Once we have all the ingredients, how can we cook our recipe to obtain mathe matical knowledge?" As Putnam argues: "It do es seem at firs t blush as if the sole method tha t mathematicians do use or can use is the me thod of mathematical proof, and as if that me thod consists Simply in deriving conclusions from axioms which have been fixed once and for all by ru les of derivation which have been fixed once and for all." 7 Putnam creates an interesting story about Marti an ma the ma t-ics w here Marti ans, in testing theories, use 'quasi-real num bers were not introduced through a rigorous empirica l' methods which consist of statements gen -mathematical justification . However, the use of real eralized by induction. This method of acquiring math-numbers in mathematics now enables us to con struct ema tical knowledge creates a new concept which we more complicated theo ries. can ca ll: 'mathematical confirma tion'. Putnam argues that our refusal to use th is 'Ma rtian' method limits To conclude, mathematics is a very interesting branch the range of our proofs to only ana lytical ones. If we with lots of questions concern ing its origin, study, were to use quasi-empirical methods, we could also methodology and its dir ection . It is, though. a uniqu e enjoy the discovery of syn thetic truths in mathemat-branch because it is precise, objective and universal. ics. Actually, when we look back at our history, we It does not directly conjectu re on na tu re as do the natuenco unter the use of quasi -empirical methods. As ral sciences, but it provides a lan guage and foundaPutn am suggests, the Greeks lacked the mathemati-tion on which natural sciences can base their stud ies cal experience and mathema tical sophistication, and securely.The object of mat hematics is not a subjective therefore , they used generaliza tions in their ma th-object, but one can feel its power through its preciseema tical conjectures. The sim plest example is tha t the ness, consistency and fru itfulness. 
